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To put the matter bluntly the present course is a
response to the growing demand for an intellectual
attitude in law. Many of us have been too content to
accept unquestioningly the aphorism that the common
law is the perfection of all reason. Some lawyers have
gone through life thinking that results they see about
them are the outcome of natural law and inevitable.
The present materials will justify themselves if they do
no more than acquaint the student with some of the
vital ideas in legal scholarship.

E

lements of the Law has been a fixture of the first-year
curriculum since 1937 and has been taught by a
more than a dozen faculty members since its inception.
The description of the course in the Law School catalog has
changed very little, but the content and nominal objective
have changed, sometimes radically, with each new instructor.
The changes have been the product not only of professorial
idiosyncrasy but also of continuously shifting focus in
theories both of teaching and of precedent in American law.
As with so many dramatic changes at the University of
Chicago in the 1930s, Elements of the Law began with a
conversation prompted by Robert Maynard Hutchins, who
left the deanship of Yale Law School to become President of
the University in 1929 at the age of 30. Hutchins inherited a
distinguished research university whose initial momentum
from its founding at the turn
of the century was beginning
to flag. Nonetheless, many
members of the faculty were
strong, and the undergraduate
curriculum was in the process
of being revitalized. Hutchins
was eager to impose his own
stamp on higher education,
both in Chicago and nationally.
He embraced the classics,
especially as presented by his
Edward Levi
intellectual aide-de-camp,
Mortimer Adler, and correspondingly distrusted the empirical
social sciences; the ultimate enemy was narrow professionalism,
either of the curriculum or of the faculty. So it was natural
that Hutchins, rebuffed by the divisional faculty on some early
initiatives, would turn to the Law School to apply his hand.
Edward Levi, who had graduated from the Law School
in 1935 and had spent the following academic year as a
Sterling Fellow at Yale Law School, discussed the issue of an
introductory course with Hutchins during mid-September
of 1936. The next day, Levi sent Hutchins a copy of the
introduction he and Roscoe T. Steffen of the Yale faculty
had prepared for a set of materials entitled “The Elements
of the Law.” The presentation undoubtedly appealed to
Hutchins. The materials were dotted with snippets from
the classics (Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Sir Henry
Maine) as well as from famous cases at common law, and
the introduction was frankly contrarian:
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A year later, Levi taught Elements of the Law for the first
time as a required course for entering students and used
the Levi-Steffen materials.
The letter to Hutchins was a calculated risk on multiple
levels. Levi acknowledged in the final paragraph that he
was leapfrogging the academic chain of command in taking
a curriculum proposal to the President of the University:
“I feel that the form of this communication may be a
breach of etiquette, but this is a pretty important matter
and I am willing to risk it.” The “this” was twofold: both
the proposal for the course and an addendum implicitly
recommending Friedrich Kessler for an appointment to
the law faculty to teach comparative law. Elements was the
more pressing issue, however, because the intellectual
emphasis of the new curriculum would be framed by the
introductory course. Levi was eager for something besides
the traditional litany of received wisdom about courts,
precedent, and reasoning by analogy adding up to the
“perfection of reason.” At the same time, but not even
bubbling beneath the surface of his correspondence with
Hutchins, the Levi-Steffen materials were an indirect
repudiation of the most extreme tenets of the American
“Legal Realist” movement that had developed before World
War I, crested around 1930–31, and was, at this point, on
the downward arc of its influence in the legal academy.
In its simplest and most extreme forms, Legal Realism
rejected the idea of law as a system of rules logically
developed and rigorously applied. Rather, legal decisions
were seen as the products of personal and political bias,
presented in a syllogistic form. The formal opinions were
said to be really no more than post hoc rhetorical exercises.
As Karl Llewellyn, the most voluble and colorful of the
Realists, put it in his introductory lectures to first-year law
students at Columbia University (first published in 1930
as The Bramble Bush):
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This doing of something about disputes, this doing
of it reasonably, is the business of law. And the people
who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges
or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are the officials
of the law. What these officials do about disputes is,
to my mind, the law itself.1

card-carrying Realist, but Elements of the Law as edited by
Levi and Steffen was hardly a doctrinaire Realist casebook.
The selections attempted to demonstrate the influence and
development of philosophical strains in Anglo-American
law, and the case law examples illustrated a practical logic
if not a tidy geometric system. None of the Realist tracts
from Frank and Llewellyn or others was excerpted. The
furious debate in the law reviews and
evangelical prescriptions of The
Bramble Bush were invisible.
The focus and tone of the
Elements materials should have
surprised no one. In writings at the
time, both Steffen and Levi had
gone out of their way to
disavow many of the Realists’ more
extreme enthusiasms. Steffen was a
Friedrich Kessler
commercial lawyer who had taught
at Yale since 1925, five years after taking his LLB there. He
taught at the University of Chicago Law School in the
summer of 1934, where he met Levi, who was a year away
from taking his law degree. Steffen
wrote extensively, particularly in
the areas of negotiable instruments
and banking, but also in agency
and labor law. He also advocated
changes in legal curricula and
teaching materials. Speaking to the
annual meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools in 1932,
Steffen ridiculed the “evangelical
Karl Llewellyn
realist” who claimed “that rules
and principles are wholly illusory; they are all subject to
change without notice—and apparently for no discernible
reason. I do not think I need to argue with this body that
that is gross overstatement of the situation.”
Edward Levi had tried to set himself off from the more
extreme Realists in an essay published in 1938 entitled

Another passage echoed Oliver Wendell Holmes in his
famous speech, “The Path of the Law”:
And rules, through all of this, are important so far as
they help you see or predict what judges will do or so
far as they help you get judges to do something. That
is their importance. That is all their importance,
except as pretty playthings. But you will discover that
you can no more afford to overlook them than you
can afford to stop with having learned their words.2
The year in which these passages were published, 1930,
and the following year signaled the high-water mark of
Legal Realism. Llewellyn and Roscoe Pound squared off in
a famous exchange in the Harvard Law Review, and reviews
of Jerome Frank’s psychologically oriented critique of the
legal system, Law and the Modern Mind, simultaneously
stoked the theoretical fires. With the arrival of the New
Deal in 1933, the energy of the Realist critique began to
dissipate. Many self-styled Realists took leaves to work in
Washington for Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Supreme
Court’s “horse and buggy” reading of the Constitution
created practical and political problems more urgent than
a debate in professional journals.
Although Legal Realism was on the wane, the issues
that provoked the controversy were far from dead. At stake
was no less than the question of whether law was an
autonomous discipline or simply a specialized subfield of
political rhetoric. The Levi-Steffen materials had something
to say about the debate, but it was subtle and indirect.
They had collaborated in one of the intellectual hothouses
of the Realist movement, Yale Law School, and Llewellyn
viewed Steffen as an intellectual fellow traveler if not a

Elements of the Law has been taught
every Autumn or Autumn/Winter since
1937, with the exception of two years
(1976 and 1984) when it was replaced by
a 1L course in Constitutional Law.
Beginning in 1988 the course was split
into two sections, and was also taught
in two sections in 1942, 1962, and 1969.
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The affinity between Steffen and Levi suggests that
Chicago would have been a natural place for Steffen and
Elements a natural course for him to teach, and, indeed,
Levi tried to recruit Steffen. Or rather Robert Maynard
Hutchins added Steffen to the growing list of Yale faculty
members he tried to recruit during the 1930s in order
to enhance the stature of the Law School. However,

“The Natural Law, Precedent, and Thurman Arnold.”3
Arnold was, like Jerome Frank, one of the more rhetorically
bellicose Realists, and his books, The Symbols of Government
and The Folklore of Capitalism, were central tracts in the later
days of the Realist episode. In patient and self-conscious
steps, Levi accused Arnold of being a closet natural lawyer
whose descriptions of legal reasoning tended to the mystical
and whose prescriptions were
circular. Although Levi claimed to
be reconciling three “approaches to
law”—natural law, precedent, and
the “Thurman Arnold way”—the
essay in fact anticipates in
argument and presentation his
famous monograph, published a
decade later, as An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning.
Harry Kalven
In Levi’s hands, then, the
Levi-Steffen materials used for the first time in 1937 for
Elements were a sustained dose of anti-Realism, at least
in its most flamboyant forms. The materials introduced
students to basic principles and
concepts of the Anglo-American
customary legal system,
emphasizing two overriding
themes: the influence of social
and political theory outside the legal
system on the system’s behavior,
and the incremental, sometimes
un-self-conscious, development of
new legal principles. If the traditional
Soia Mentschikoff
emphasis in first-year law school
courses was on the science of making deductions from legal
rules, the Levi-Steffen approach taught that the important
problems in law involved making a choice between rules,
and doing so in a deliberate, disciplined fashion that
avoided the artificial mysteries or conclusory certitude
of the “Thurman Arnold way.”

At stake was no less than
the question of whether law was
an autonomous discipline or
simply a specialized subfield of
political rhetoric.
Hutchins’s only successful attempt to raid Yale before
World War II was Friedrich Kessler, whom Levi had
recommended to him when he returned from his
postgraduate year at Yale. Kessler joined the faculty in
1939, became a full professor in 1943, but returned to
Yale in 1947, largely for financial reasons.
World War II dramatically affected the Law School and
the University as a whole. Enrollment in all units fell,
university facilities were utilized for military and related
training, and the future of the institution became clouded.
Generous salaries and raids on other faculties became distant
memories almost overnight. Teaching loads increased
markedly, and the University struggled to keep afloat
financially. In the fall of 1940, Edward Levi relinquished
Elements to Kessler, who taught the course until 1944.
Levi explained the change to Hutchins a few months earlier
in a confidential memorandum in which he reported that
his Spring Quarter course load included “Elements of the
Law, Risk (which you knew as Agency); Philosophy of Law;
Bankruptcy and Reorganization, and Moot Court”—a

1943

1945

1951

Kessler

Levi

Llewellyn

S P R I N G

2 0 1 3

■

T H E

U N I V E R S I T Y

O F

C H I C A G O

L A W

S C H O O L

25

total of 22 class hours per week, not counting tutorial
responsibilities for first-year students. “This situation is
not good for me nor for anyone else,” said Levi. Hutchins
responded with characteristic dash and buoyancy: “I have
learned with regret that you are not working hard enough.
Mr. Adler and I will be glad to turn over to you the class
which we are scheduled to teach in the Law School next
year in order to round out your program.”
Enrollment trends in the Law School became grave as
the war progressed, and Hutchins
could not disguise the fact with
either eloquence or flippancy. In
the academic year in which he
taunted Levi, the Law School conferred 53 degrees; three years later,
at the conclusion of the 1942–43
school year, the number had
plummeted to nine. Enrollments
did not return to prewar levels
Phil Neal
until the 1946–47 academic year.
In 1945, Levi reclaimed his franchise on the Elements
course, even though Kessler continued on the faculty for
two more years.
After what can fairly be called a near-death experience
during the war, the Law School was reinvigorated by the
postwar boom. Enrollments surged, spurred by the G.I.
Bill. The entering class for 1946–47 was allowed to reach
125, and that meant new faculty had to be hired as the
returning veterans began to spread out over the entire
curriculum. The losses of three senior professors—Kessler
(to Yale), George Bogert (emeritus), and Charles O. Gregory
(to Virginia)—meant that several courses were understaffed
or not covered: torts, labor law, trusts, commercial law,
legal history, and international law. Hutchins was willing
to add one, and possibly two, senior faculty members to
meet the shortfall, so the Committee on Additions to the
Faculty recommended to Hutchins the appointment of
“two of the following persons: Professor David Cavers of

Harvard, Professor Roscoe Steffen of Yale, Professor
Friedrich Kessler of Yale.” Only Steffen came, but the
appointment made a splash in the profession because it
was said that no chaired member of the Yale law faculty
had ever left to accept appointment at another law school.
More significant changes in staffing and teaching were on
the way. Over the private but fierce objections of some
anti-Semitic trustees, Hutchins appointed Edward Levi
Dean of the Law School in 1950. Levi, hoping to capitalize
on the momentum that began to
build with Steffen’s appointment,
immediately took two steps that
promised to enlarge the School’s
national profile. He engineered the
appointment of Karl Llewellyn and
Soia Mentschikoff to the faculty,
and he convinced Hutchins to
authorize 20 one-year, full-tuition
scholarships to students entering the
Gerhard Casper
Law School in 1951 in order to
improve the quality and geographic diversity of the
application pool. Llewellyn was 57 years old and had
taught at Columbia Law School since 1925 after six years
at Yale, his alma mater. He was
now best known not as the author
of The Bramble Bush, but as the
chief reporter for the Uniform
Commercial Code. Mentschikoff,
45, was the assistant chief reporter
for the Code and his third wife.
Both had held visiting positions at
Harvard Law School in 1948–49,
but antinepotism rules precluded
David Strauss
their joint appointment there;
Columbia had a similar policy. Levi finessed Chicago’s
comparable policy by appointing Mentschikoff as
“Professorial Lecturer,” a position under the Statutes of the
University that did not implicate antinepotism policies.

1962
Levi
Kalven
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The appointments of Llewellyn and Mentschikoff,
combined with the earlier appointment of Steffen, were
designed to identify the Law School as a center for the
study of commercial law on an international basis. But
Llewellyn was also nationally prominent in legal theory
(his chair at Columbia was the Betts Professorship of
Jurisprudence), and he had one of the most sustained
records in the profession of writing on legal education.
With Levi now occupied by the deanship, Llewellyn was the
natural choice to teach Elements.
Indeed, perhaps he should be
described as the “irresistible”
choice, notwithstanding the facts
that Levi had just published his
classic monograph, An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning, and that the
Levi-Steffen materials had now
reached a fourth edition and had
been published by the University
Cass Sunstein
of Chicago Press. As anyone knows
who has ploughed through The Bramble Bush, let alone
heard or seen him in action, Llewellyn was a self-styled
force of nature—exuberant, rambunctious, taunting,
inspirational, and sometimes
exasperatingly obscure. By the time
he arrived in Chicago, the Realist
moment had passed, and the
firebrands of the 1930s had
become domesticated, as deans
(Wesley Sturges), wealthy lawyers
(Thurman Arnold), and even
judges (Jerome Frank). Llewellyn,
by contrast, was unreconstructed:
Joseph Isenbergh
he no longer preached Realism—at
least in print—but he continued to practice it, and Elements
of the Law was the perfect podium for him.
The materials Llewellyn used for his brand of Elements
could not have been more different from the Levi-Steffen

materials. None of the classic philosophers appeared in the
mimeographed materials; they comprised only cases, and
principally cases from one jurisdiction—New York State.
The cases covered different topics, such as “indefiniteness”
in contracts, warranties, or the law of foreign remittances,
but the subject matter was incidental. For Llewellyn, the
purpose of the course was to teach the craft of lawyering.
To do that, he tried to create an almost clinical atmosphere in
the classroom. Students would treat cases as problems, often
taking the side of plaintiff or defendant, and then try to
provide advice or to develop arguments to present to courts
should the problem become a case or the case become a
decision to be appealed. Thus, the single jurisdiction was
essential to the teaching strategy: Students needed to “learn
the law”—or appreciate its ambiguities and gaps—in order
to work out their “advice.” As Llewellyn inimitably
explained on the second day of class in 1955:
I call your attention to one thing, however, that
distinguishes this assignment of cases from any other
that you have had—you will have noticed that all of
this set of cases come from a single court in a single state.
And with this change in order, you will note that they
occur in time sequence. The effect of this is that you
are, as you work into the series of cases, coming to see
them with pretty much the same eyes with which the
lawyers and the respective courts saw the cases. The
bulk of what has gone before is in your hands as you
approach the case. And we can start to work over what
it is the court was doing and the lawyers were doing
case by case, and see what the process was that was
going on. We are studying primarily in these cases the
process. What was the lawyers’ job and how did they
perform it? What was the court’s job and how did it
perform it? And we see a new job coming up—the eternal
problem of the court is with us; no matter how much
you have got done a new one is coming up tomorrow.
And we see the new ones come up and see the court use
their old machinery for the purpose of dealing with it.
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Although law schools were beginning to emphasize
theory over rules in the classroom, Llewellyn remained as
fixed in the 1950s as he had been 30 years before on the
imperative of teaching “skills,” even in large first-year classes.
In his view, first-year courses were often confused by the
combination of substance and what he called “craft-skills”
being taught from the same casebooks. His solution was
not without its own problems, however. As two experienced
second-generation teachers of the materials explain:

depending on the year, at least one reading of Levi’s
Introduction to Legal Reasoning. From time to time, guest
lecturers addressed the class, but Llewellyn’s efforts to
enlist fellow first-year teachers in coordinating their
presentations with his were routinely if politely declined.
Karl Llewellyn taught Elements from 1951 until 1961, a
few months before his death. Harry Kalven, who tended to
take a more historically oriented approach to the course,
and Edward Levi split the teaching duties in 1962, and
Harry W. Jones, visiting from
Columbia, taught the course in
1963. Then Mentschikoff took
over her late husband’s materials
and the course from 1964 to 1973,
after which she left the Law School
to become Dean of the University
of Miami Law School. The
franchise was intact, at least
symbolically, but much of the energy
Dennis J. Hutchinson
had gone out of the enterprise.
Mentschikoff dutifully worked through the materials, but
her passion seemed uneven and her final examinations
often included an hour of true/false questions, which struck
many students as undermining the emphasis on craft and
nuance developed by the materials and the class. Nonetheless,
both she and Llewellyn inspired countless students, either by
their enthusiasm and warmth or by quiet acts of kindness in
an often forbidding world. Nor was their long-term influence
negligible. Geoffrey Stone attributes Mentschikoff ’s
Elements class, which he took in 1968, as the inspiration
for his seminar Constitutional Decisionmaking (see page 18),
which year in and out has won praise from students for its
challenging structure—writing judicial opinions tabula
rasa, based only on the text, followed by application of the
precedents developed from scratch to new situations.
Mentschikoff ’s departure posed somewhat of a quandary
for the curriculum. In an academic ethos growingly
committed to theory and in a profession struggling to

The presentation of the material in this form, in a
course whose name revealed neither its content nor
purpose, to students hungry for knowledge and
direction, raised difficult questions of pedagogy for
the instructor and created a tendency on the part of
students to treat Elements as an afterthought to their
apparently more relevant substantive courses.4
Worse, Llewellyn tended to overload his intellectual
agenda for the course without clear indication to his students
of when he was changing focus. At one minute, he was
emphasizing “craft-technical” skills, at another “area-policy”
questions, and at another questions of “general jurisprudence.”

Mentschikoff and Llewellyn
inspired countless students, either
by their enthusiasm and warmth
or by quiet acts of kindness in an
often forbidding world.
Compounding the problem was Llewellyn’s tendency to
proclaim, without much elaboration, that the “arts of the
legal crafts” were imbued with “deep truths about man’s
nature and man’s life with his fellowman.” To top it off,
the materials and class presentations were supplemented
by required readings—plural—of The Bramble Bush, and,
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develop sensible critiques to the explosion of public law
two decades after Brown v Board of Education revolutionized
aspirations for the Constitution, “craft-skills” sounded dated
or pedestrian. Dean Phil Neal taught Elements in 1975,
and future Dean Gerhard Casper filled in the following
year, but the course fell out of the curriculum in 1976.
Then Edward Levi returned from his service as Attorney
General and took up the course again from 1977 to 1983.
During that period, and following his formal retirement in
1984, he worked steadily to revise
the Levi-Steffen materials, which
had last been modified in 1950,
but he never settled on a final
version before his death.
Cass Sunstein taught the course
for the first time in 1985, and
David Strauss did so the following
year. Their versions of the Elements
course cover the problem of
Rosalind Dixon
reasoning by analogy in the case
law system but also touch on larger themes that students
encounter throughout the curriculum such as the tension
between rules and discretion, the conflict between coercion
and autonomy, and the recurrent mysteries of “interpretation.”
Sunstein emphasized questions about the meanings of
liberty and equality, the proper role of judicial review
(tending to focus on Lochner v New York and the problems
of constitutional “baselines”), and, later, rationality and
behavioral economics. Strauss begins his course with a line
of common-law cases that Levi employed in his Introduction
and then compares the developments in those cases with
the argument in Benjamin N. Cardozo’s The Nature of the
Judicial Process. Aristotle makes an appearance, as do
John Stuart Mill and Shakespeare; Edmund Burke plays a
leading role along with Cardozo. But there is also behavioral
economics, feminism, Friedrich Hayek, Holmes (of course),
and John Rawls. Recent enlistees to the Elements faculty
have included Richard McAdams and Geoffrey Stone.

1984

BY THE NUMBERS
16 – Number of professors who have taught Elements
2 – Number of visitors who have taught Elements
4 – Number of faculty members who have taught
Elements only once (excluding visitors)
23 – Number of times David Strauss has taught
Elements (most of anyone)
12 – Longest consecutive stretch of years with the
same faculty member(s) teaching Elements
(Strauss and Sunstein, 1996-2007)
2 – Number of years the course was not taught
(1976 and 1984)
46 – Longest number of years between a faculty
member’s first and last teaching of Elements
(1937-1983, Levi)
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formal philosophy is entirely absent. Levi had broad and
deep ambitions for his course; Llewellyn, aiming to produce
“lawyers’ lawyers,” was extremely narrow, notwithstanding
frequent grand asides and ringing maxims.
I think there are deeper commonalities between the
courses, despite their sharp differences in focus, scope, and
tone. The congruence lies in their mutual hostility to the
extreme, almost nihilistic, strain of Legal Realism and in
the corresponding optimism about the capacity of a
customary legal system to develop workable rules for
concrete problems. To some extent, Arthur Linton Corbin,
who spent half a century preaching that message, was the
godfather of Elements of the Law. Since his days as a student
at Yale Law School, Karl Llewellyn viewed Corbin as his
“father in the law”; for decades, letters from Llewellyn to
Corbin began, “Dear Dad.” In a letter to Llewellyn late in
both their lives, Corbin recounted his “fight for life as a
law teacher” during the dizzy height of Realism:

Assessing the effect of American Legal Realism on the
Yale Law School between the World Wars, John Henry
Schlegel quipped in 1979, “Curriculum reform at Yale
proceeded in the time-honored way with the acquisition of
new faculty members who brought new courses with them
and the departure of old faculty
members who took their old
courses away.” The experience at
Chicago with respect to Elements
is more a twice-told tale, with
Edward Levi trying to provide a
philosophical and pedagogical
antidote to Realism before the war,
with Llewellyn and Mentschikoff
trying to plant Realist pedagogy in
Geoffrey Stone
the theory-thickening air of Hyde
Park, and finally Levi restoring the introductory course to true
north. To some extent, the syllabi support that interpretation,
notwithstanding that Levi’s Introduction to Legal Reasoning
was routinely a common text, regardless of the instructor,
from 1949, when it was published,
until Levi’s retirement 35 years later.
The disparity between the two
approaches could not be greater.
Levi’s materials included numerous
excerpts from classical philosophy,
including, for example, Plato,
Hobbes, Locke, Engels, Hans Kelsen,
Savigny, Aristotle (Nicomachean
Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric), St. Thomas
Richard McAdams
Aquinas, and H. L. A. Hart (and
that’s just in the first 200 pages of almost 1,200 pages of
photocopied materials that also included case law). Llewellyn
included no philosophy, only cases. Even the edition of the
materials that were eventually published posthumously
under Mentschikoff ’s direction adds only notes or the
occasional essay by a lawyer (often Llewellyn) or a judge;
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Probably 1928, when I had to drive a good beginning
class to study the Law of Contracts, against the competition in their other courses of Bob Hutchins, Lee
Tulin, and Leon Green, all three telling these beginners that there is no “law,” only separate cases—that
each decision is a “chigger” decision or a stomach
burp—that there are no organized molecules, only
individual atoms—and all three (however green
behind the ears) telling it with explosive atomic
power. Did Bob Hutchins ever read an opinion?
For Corbin, the process of meticulously analyzing the facts
and results of cases, then trying to generate a workable
rule, was the essence of legal scholarship; showing students
how to discern the patterns of behavior beneath the surface
rhetoric of opinions was at the heart of law teaching.
Llewellyn used vastly different rhetoric, calling the process
“the Grand Style” throughout his career, but essentially
marched in Corbin’s footsteps. And, in many respects, so did
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Fritz Kessler, whom Corbin said was “like a brother,”
although his civil-law background brought different
insights and concerns to the debate.
Edward Levi had little trouble aligning himself with the
Corbin-Llewellyn view of legal reasoning. Levi emphasized in
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning that the kind of reasoning
involved in the legal process is one in which the classification
changes as the classification is made. The rules change as
the rules are applied. More important, the rules arise out
of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates
the rules and then applies them . . . . A controversy as to
whether the law is certain, unchanging, and expressed in
rules, or uncertain, changing, and only a technique for
deciding specific cases misses the point. It is both.5
It is a testament to Levi’s tact and ingenuity that he could
work closely and effectively from the very outset with Robert
Maynard Hutchins, whose views of the legal process, at least
when he was most deeply involved in it, were light-years from
his own. It is true that Hutchins changed over time—many
thought opportunistically—but in 1937 Hutchins declared,
“No law professor can claim to be one if he separates himself altogether from the ‘realistic’ movement.” Like so many
of his pronouncements at the time, his views are presented
at such a general level that it is difficult to pin down
exactly what he thinks.
However elusive Hutchins was, and is, the message of
the Corbin-Llewellyn-Levi (-Kessler) lesson was clear,
whether conveyed adequately by the syllabus or not, and
is captured by almost every lawyer’s favorite poet,
Wallace Stevens:

Kessler) by cold patience and incessant questioning of the
conventional wisdom. In the end, we all became Realists to
some degree, whether we appreciated it or not, and the
challenge of their successors in the classroom was to figure
out what to do with the realization. Llewellyn stated the
challenge, almost as a mantra, in his teaching materials
and from the podium for generations: “Ideals without
technique are a mess. But technique without ideals is a
menace.” As long as Elements of the Law remains in the
first-year curriculum, this I know: Whatever the course
description, the urgent issues Llewellyn reduced to an
aphorism will remain at the heart of the course.
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A. A violent order is disorder; and
B. A great disorder is an order.
These Two things are one.6
Corbin communicated the point by enormous industry
and lucidity for almost a half-century; Llewellyn by
bombast, cajolery, and passionate insistence; Levi (and
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